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1. INTRODUCTION
International data encryption algorithm (IDEA) is 128 bit 
key size symmetric block cipher. It was designed by Xuejia and 
James of ETH-Zürich which operates on 64-bit plaintext data 
block2. The purpose of IDEA was to replace data encryption 
standard (DES) cipher, which became practically insecure due 
to its small key size of 56 bits and increased computational 
power. It is included in pretty good privacy (PGP)3 to provide 
data security. It was designed in the beginning of the 90’s by 
mixing three different algebraically incompatible operations. 
Using these three operations a strong round function is 
constructed and this round function operates eight times on 
plaintext. IDEA is designed to provide more of security as 
compared to speed.
2. THE IDEA BLOCK CIPHER
IDEA is a symmetric key block cipher which uses 64 
bits block of data at a time for encryption using 128 bit key. 
It was intended to replace DES cipher. So, design of IDEA 
was motivated with the goal of removing the issues with DES 
cipher. DES uses small key size of 56 bits. So IDEA was 
designed with 128 bits of key which made it quite difficult to 
exhaustively try all possible keys in far future. Diffusion is a 
desirable cryptographic property which is basically means that 
each plaintext bit should affect all bits of cipher text and also 
each key bit should affect all the cipher bits. Diffusion hides the 
statistical properties of plaintext and key in ciphertext. IDEA 
exhibits very good diffusion property using multiplication and 
addition (MA) structure (in Fig. 1) which has two additions 
and two multiplication operations in it. The MA structure is 
applied in each round of the cipher. In Confusion, the ciphertext 
is dependent on plaintext and key is in very complicated and 
involved way. Confusion was achieved in DES using XOR and 
small nonlinear 6x4 substitution boxes while IDEA uses three 
different unrelated operations.
Overall IDEA exhibits good cryptographic properties, 
ease of implementation and resists all existing cryptanalysis 
techniques. The IDEA block cipher consists of 8 identical 
rounds in which 64-bit block of data and 128-bit key is used 
(Fig. 2. illustrates one round). One single round uses of 6 
sub-keys and each sub-key consist of 16 bit word (totaling 
6*16=96 bits). These six sub-keys for a particular k-th round 
is denoted by Zj
k, where 0 ≤ j ≤ 5. After such 8 rounds, output 
transformation is performed which is often called half round. 









k) where each vector 
element is 16 bit word. Rounds keys are derived from the 
128-bit main master key by shifting it circularly left, which 
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keys of eight rounds and 4 keys of output transformation i.e. 52 
(48+4) keys are needed. Main key of IDEA is of 128-bit, which 
is divided into 8 sub-keys 16-bits each. First round extracts 6 
sub-keys from these 8 keys. Followed by circular left shift of 
the key by 25 bits, then next eight sub-keys are extracted in the 
similar fashion. This process is repeated until all 52 required 
sub-keys are generated as shown in Table 1. Here, Z1
k indicates 
first sub-key where k is round number and 1 shows key number 
of round. Table 1, shows how 128-bit key is scheduled with 
respect to each round with 25 bit circular left shift.
 
2.2 Application of IDEA in PGP
Zimmermann3 alone designed and developed pretty good 
privacy (PGP) in 1991. PGP provides mainly confidentiality, 
integrity, compression and authentication for electronic mail 
(Email) and file storage. PGP is now an RFC 3156. It uses 
four different kinds of keys i.e. one time session keys, public 
keys, private keys and passphrase based symmetric keys. 
Figure 1. Multiplication addition structure (MA).
Figure 2. Round k. of IDEA.
Z1k Z2k Z3k Z4k Z5k Z6k
1 K[0-15] K[16-31] K[32-47] K[48-63] K[64-79] K[80-95]
2 K[96-111] K[112-127] K[25-40] K[41-56] K[57-72] K[73-88]
3 K[89-97] K[105-120] K[121-8] K[9-24] K[50-65] K[66-81]
4 K[82-97] K[98-113] K[114-1] K[2-17] K[18-33] K[34-49]
5 K[75-90] K[91-106] K[107-122] K[123-10] K[11-26] K[27-42]
6 K[43-58] K[59-74] K[100-115] K[116-3] K[4-19] K[20-35]
7 K[36-51] K[52-67] K[68-83] K[84-99] K[125-12] K[13-28]
8 K[29-44] K[45-60] K[61-76] K[77-92] K[93-108] K[109-124]
8.5 K[22-37] K[38-53] K[54-69] K[70-85] - -
Table 1.  Key-Schedule of IDEA Cipher. K[0-15] denotes bits from 0 to 15 of 128-bit 
key (K)
will be explained in detail in next section of key scheduling. 
In each round of operations mixing these three algebraically 
incompatible group operations are performed.
Bit-by-bit Exclusive OR denoted as • ⊕ .
Addition of unsigned integers modulo 2• 16 (65536), denoted 
as ⊞ .
Multiplication of unsigned integers modulo 2• 16+1 (65537) 
denoted as  .
Round k is defined by following operations:
First of all calculate two intermediate values:
( )0 0 2 2    (   )k k k k ka X Z X Z= ⊕  ,
1 1 3    (   )  ( )
k k k kb X Z X= ⊕
These two values are input of multiplication-addition 
(MA) box which results in:
4 5((( ) ) )
k k k kc a Z bk Z=  
( )  4    (  )k k k kd a Z a=                       
The output of k-th round is obtained through:
 
0 0 0 ((  ) )
k k k kW X Z c= ⊕ ,
 
1 2 2 ((  )  )
k k k kW X Z c= ⊕ ,
2 1 1     ((  ) )
k k k kW X Z d= ⊕ ,
3 3 3  ((  ) )
k k k kW X Z d= ⊕
After the 8 rounds final key whitening 
layer is applied:
( )9 9 90 0 0  W X Z=  ;
9 9 9
1 2 1 (   )W X Z=  ;
9 9 9
2 1 2 (   );W X Z= 
9 9 9
3 3 3  ( )W X Z= 
2.1 Sub-Key Schedule
Each round of IDEA requires 6 sub-keys 
and there are 8.5 rounds, so in total 8*6=48 
k
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One time session keys are used as an encryption key for the 
block ciphers used in PGP. Public and private keys are mainly 
used for providing authentication plus to securely transfer 
the session keys between communicating parties. Integrity of 
data is basically to ensure that data has not been modified in 
transit accidentally or maliciously, and is achieved by using 
hash function SHA-1 in PGP. It uses symmetric key encryption 
because it is faster as compared to asymmetric key encryption. 
But uses asymmetric key cryptography for exchange of small 
session keys which are used as keys for symmetric block 
cipher.
Confidentiality: Confidentiality is achieved by encrypting 
the information. In case of PGP three symmetric block ciphers 
are available for encryption e.g. CAST-128, Triple DES and 
IDEA. IDEA is widely used option for encryption. 
Below the steps are described how IDEA cipher is used 
for providing confidentiality in PGP.
(a) It generates a random string of 128 bits which will 
be used as a key for IDEA cipher. For every session 
a different key is generated.
(b) Data (email or file) is encrypted using IDEA cipher 
in Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode. In CFB mode only 
64 bits of cipher are fed. Data is encrypted in block 
sizes of 64 bits at a time.
(c) Key is encrypted using RSA or DSS public key of 
intended receiver and sent it along with encrypted 
data to receiver.
(d) Receiver first decrypts the session key by applying 
his RSA or DSS private key.
(e) Finally session key is used to decrypt the data using 
IDEA decryption.
PGP success is mainly because it is an open standard. PGP 
runs on most of the platforms flawlessly such as Windows, 
linux or Mac. It uses best in class cryptographic algorithms 
for providing the authentication and confidentiality. These 
algorithms used in PGP are widely tested by public over a long 
period of time and considered secure.
PGP provides authentication using RSA / DSS / Diffie 
Hellman key exchange, compression of data using zip, 
integrity of data using SHA-1 hash function. PGP also 
provides segmentation of data when email data is more than 
50 K octets.
PGP achieves confidentiality of data using IDEA cipher. 
Since IDEA cipher has key size of 128 bits which provide 
security of order 2128. To try all 2128 that is 340 282 366 930 938 
463 463 374 607 431 768 211 456 different keys systematically 
will take 1000 of years for even the fastest super computer of 
the world.
 
2.3  Important attacks on Block Cipher
Ciphertext only: In cryptography, a ciphertext-only attack 
(COA) is the most difficult attack scenario from cryptanalytic 
point of view in which cryptanalyst is assumed to have only 
a few ciphertexts data with him. COA is the most difficult to 
cryptanalyse since no other side channel information is available. 
In case of practical COA, attacker still has few knowledge of 
the plaintext. Just like the attacker might know the language in 
which the plaintext is presented or the required distribution of 
strings or characters in the plaintext. Mostly standard protocol 
data or messages are part of the plaintext in many deployed 
systems and these can be easily guessed or known efficiently 
as part of COA on these systems. COA is considered successful 
if cryptanalyst manages to find corresponding plaintext data 
and if the key is found than it is a breakthrough. This ability 
to obtain any amount of information from the underlying 
ciphertext is considered as an achievement of attack. 
Known Plaintext: The known-plaintext attack (KPA) is an 
attack scenario in which cryptanalyst has access to one or more 
plaintext-ciphertext pairs formed with the secret key which is 
unknown. Example of such scenario is mobile communication 
or network traffic in which it is known that first few packets or 
data is fixed and whatever initial encrypted data we are getting 
is corresponding ciphertext. The goal is to find the key or 
decrypt the rest of data for which plaintext is not known.
Chosen Plaintext: Chosen plaintext attack (CPA) is an 
attack scenario in which cryptanalyst has access to encryption 
box or oracle. Wherein cryptanalyst can choose any number 
of different plaintext messages and can get corresponding 
ciphertext (CT) message. So basically he does not the 
encryption key still he can encrypt the plaintext messages. 
In general, it does not seem a practical possible scenario. But 
nowadays ciphers are implemented in hardware and software, 
where we can get such access such as once we get the cipher 
device (hardware) or encryption box we can supply plaintext 
to it and get ciphertexts but key is not accessible since it is 
embedded inside the box. In case of public key cryptosystem 
where the encryption key is public, so we can encrypt any 
number of messages. Therefore certain attacks are possible 
using CPA in which user has multiple messages under same 
key and can retrieve the encryption key also.
Chosen Ciphertext: Chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) 
is an attack scenario in which the cryptanalyst can choose 
number of ciphertexts and supply it into decryption oracle/
box and get corresponding plaintext but he does not know the 
actual decryption key used. CCA is a probable scenario since 
encryption and decryption functions of ciphers are implemented 
on hardware and software nowadays. Once attacker has 
the decryption box with him he can perform any number of 
decryption on the plaintexts of his choice. The goal here is not 
to figure out what is the message for given ciphertext but what 
key is being used in decryption function.
Chosen Text: In this attack, cryptanalyst uses combination 
of chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext. Basically 
it is assumed that cryptanalyst has access to both the 
encryption and decryption oracle with him. Using this 
he can query oracle or black box for any given arbitrary 
plaintext and fetch corresponding ciphertext and vice 
versa. The goal of attacker is to just find the secret key, 
rest all information is available to him.
Differential Cryptanalysis: Is a technique to break 
certain types of ciphers. Biham and Shamir4, described 
differential cryptanalysis, in 1990. They applied differential 
cryptanalysis on DES cipher. However, Coppersmith of TJ 
Watson Research Center claimed that the IBM researchers 
who designed DES were already aware about differential 
cryptanalysis. Differential cryptanalysis is more suitable 
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in the chosen plaintext attack (CPA) scenario wherein 
attacker can choose the plaintext for encryption.The method 
searches for plaintext, ciphertext pairs whose difference is 
constant, in this method basically measure the difference 
between the two ciphertexts is measured as a function 
of the difference between the corresponding plaintexts. 
This difference is generally calculated by X-ORing the 
plaintexts pairs and X-ORing the ciphertexts pairs. E.g. 
the difference of two plaintexts M1 and M2 is defined 
as M1 ⊕ M2 bit-wise exclusive or (XOR) operation for 
DES. However the difference may be define in other 
ways too for other ciphers. Now the highest probability 
differential input is calculated, called characteristic which 
can be traced through several rounds of the cipher. Now 
assign these probabilities to the keys and locate the 
most probable key.
The Square Attack: Integral Cryptanalysis is also called 
SQARE attack because it was first designed and attempted by 
Khudsen5 on block cipher SQARE, but the attack is not limited 
to the particular cipher SQARE. Knudsen showed it that the 
attack is more suitable to the block cipher based on SPN 
structures. Later on it was extended to the cipher having fiestal 
structure such as DES cipher and ARX based cipher also. The 
name integral cryptanalysis is taken from integral calculus. The 
X-OR difference of set of plaintext is kept 0 and by observing 
ciphertext difference he tried to figure out the operations of 
cipher in this attack.
Meet in the Middle Attack: Meet in the Middle (MITM) 
was first introduced by Diffie and Hellman. It is a generic attack 
applicable to several ciphers and does not depend on internals 
of the ciphers. It just requires the encryptions and decrypting 
oracle for getting the plaintext and its corresponding cipher text 
and vice versa. They demonstrated that double DES is prone 
to MITM. In double DES to increase security, normal DES 
encryption is applied two times with two different keys say 
K1, K2 of 56 bits each. It should provide security of 2(K1+K2)= 
256+256 = 2112. However when MITM is applied on double DES 
its security is quite less as compare to 2112.
Given a plaintext-ciphertext pair (P-C) of double DES, 
apply all 256 choices of K1 on P with single DES encryption 
and store the result in sorted array. Then apply all choice of 
K2 on C with single DES decryption and search for each 
result in sorted array. Whenever we find a match, the particular 
value of K2 and its corresponding matched entry of K1 are 
the actual keys used in double DES. Total effort is just 256 for 
forward encryption and 256 for backward decryption. Search 
for matching is assumed to take constant time if applied with 
hash table for sorted result of K1 encryptions. Complexity 
is 256 + 256 = 257 which is just two time of single DES, quite 
less than expected 2112. They suggested using triple DES with 
two different keys, in order to achieve required security of 
2112 which resist MITM also. MITM is suitably applicable 
because attacker can apply brute force on two DES encryption 
independently which it cannot do on triple DES.
Boomerang Attack: It was first introduced by Wagner in 
1999, applied it to break COCONUT cipher designed in 1998. 
Using the boomerang attack, attackers are able to break the 
ciphers which were quite resistant to differential cryptanalysis. 
It differs from differential cryptanalysis in way that in order 
to cover complete cipher, it does not try to find a differential 
pattern having high probability but tries for several high 
probability patterns which may be un-related. The boomerang 
attack assumes access to both encryption and decryption 
oracles. Using the several high probable patterns it covers the 
whole cipher.
Biclique Attack: A biclique attack is a variant of the 
meet-in-the-middle (MITM) method of cryptanalysis which 
is applicable on both block cipher and hash functions. It was 
first proposed by Khovratovich, Rechberger and Savelieva 
and they applied it on AES-128 7 round version. Calculated 
complexity of order 2126.1 for full AES cipher. It utilises a 
biclique structure to increase the number of attacked rounds6 
in comparison to MITM.
3. ATTACKS ON IDEA CIPHER
Block ciphers play very crucial work to handle the 
confidentiality of data. Various cryptanalytic attacks have been 
attempted on IDEA since its inception. All the attacks presented 
so far deal with various reduced versions of IDEA. The best 
attack ever designed against IDEA is able to break 6 out of 8.5 
rounds at 2126.8 computational cost which is practically slightly 
less than exhaustive search. When we consider reduced versions 
of IDEA, it is important to consider their size in increments of 
0.5, depending on whether this component is used or not. The 
last round of output transformation is considered equivalent to 
0.5 round.
3.1 Attack attempts on IDEA Block Cipher
3.1.1 Classical Attacks
Differential Cryptanalysis: This approach is generally 
applicable to all symmetric ciphers as well as to hash functions. 
In differential cryptanalysis we observe the differences in 
plaintext, how it passes through series of transformation in cipher 
and how it can affect the resultant difference at the ciphertext. 
Based on these we compute high probable differential, use to 
find the output of (r-1) round with certain probabilities, where 
r is total no. of rounds in cipher. Now cryptanalyst can find 
the last round key by exhaustively trying all possible keys 
for decryption of ciphertext and match it with output of (r-1) 
round computed earlier. In this attack pairs of plaintexts of 
certain constant differences are used. Then attacker computes 
the differences of cipher text in-order to detect some statistical 
patterns in their distribution. In 1993, Meier7 used the above 
mentioned technique to cryptanalyse upto two and half round 
of IDEA which is quite faster than the brute force approach of 
trying all possible key choices.
Borst8, et al. cryptanalyse IDEA using a differential linear 
attack (DlA). For three and half rounds they used truncated 
differentials. Nakahara et al. proposed another approach based 
on integral for two and half rounds version of IDEA.
3.1.2. The Square Attack
Integral cryptanalysis or SQAURE attack is also a chosen 
plaintext attack approach similar to differential cryptanalysis 
technique but integral cryptanalysis uses sets or multiple 
sets of plaintext ciphertext pairs X-OR difference whereas 
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differential cryptanalysis use fixed plaintext ciphertext pairs 
X-OR difference. In integral or square approach sum of X-OR 
difference of input plaintext set is always zero, by observing 
the sum of ciphertext difference we try to figure out about 
the cipher operations. E.g. suppose input plaintext size is 64 
bits we create set of plaintexts having their first 56 bits as a 
fixed pattern and for remaining last 8 bits we have all choices, 
which give a set of 256 such plaintexts. When we sum or X-OR 
these plaintext, result is always 0 for input difference. Now we 
calculate X-OR difference of corresponding ciphertexts which 
is non zero. Extract the information about cipher operations 
using these differences. Demirici9 applied related key square 
attack on 2.5 round IDEA with time complexity of 241.
3.1.3. Simplified IDEA Variants
Some authors have attacked simplified version of IDEA, 
like Borisov10, et al. in which they replaced all (Addition of 
unsigned integers modulo 216) operations with ⊕  (Bit-by-bit 
Exclusive OR) other than in last half  round. They concluded 
that out of 216 keys one key exists in a multiplicative differential 
characteristic over eight rounds which holds with probability of 
232. Raddum11 assumed light version of IDEA called IDEA-x/2, 
in which only 50 per cent operations per rounds got changed, 
while multiplication addition (MA) structure is not modified.
3.1.4. Meet In The Middle Attack
Demirici6, et al. described meet in the middle12 (MITM) 
attack on the reduced round version of IDEA cipher. For 4 and 
4.5 round versions the attack provides a significant reduction 
in the attack’s data complexity. The MITM attack on Block 
cipher considers a intermediate value V which can be computed 
from given plaintext and will be the only part of secrete  key 
considering it to be Kt and it is easy to find from given cipher 
text and possibly will be different part of key as Kb13. The 
attack requires several pairs of known plaintext cipher text for 
guessing of Kt computed from plaintext and corresponding V 
values and store them in data structure called hash table which 
provide faster search. After that match of Kb is searched over 
hash table.
(a) Pre-computation is the first step of attack in which 
for a few chosen plaintexts it computes all choices of lSBs of 
the result C2 ⊕ C3, where C2 ⊕ C3 is ex-OR of second and 
third sub blocks of ciphertext. Then some plaintext ciphertext 
pairs are meticulously selected. These are partially decrypted 
using the different candidate keys. If the correct key is chosen 
for partial decryption than surely there is a match occurs in the 
set of pre computation and set of partial decryption process. 
It is very rare to get a match between these sets by a mere 
coincidence. This condition helps in discarding the incorrect 
candidate keys.
(b) CCA is also applicable for decipher function of IDEA. 
In order to determine more unknown decryption subkeys, there 
are two possible scenarios. First if reduced round cipher includes 
an extra half round in end than attack is applied exactly same 
as on normal cipher only the decryption keys are used in place 
of encryption keys. Second when reduced round version does 
not have that extra half round at end of cipher than attack need 
minor changes in multiplication addition half round.  For three 
round IDEA, a set of 224 ciphertexts is generated using chosen 
ciphertext attack model such that it gives certain plaintexts. 
Say these ciphertexts set as C’, then find all probable values of 
K5 and K6. Encrypt C’ using these keys for additional MA half 
round say result is C”.  Now decrypt these set of ciphertexts in 
C” using three round IDEA decryption. Compare it with two 
and half round decryption of C’ and compare these results. 
When there is match it means guessed value for K5 and K6 are 
correct else discard these wrong choices. The attack in overall 
recovers seventy three bits out of 128 bits of main key K. The 
positions of these bits in the 128 bit long main key are 10-15, 
51-66, 67-82 and 106-121. 
Biham targets simpler key scheduling algorithm in his 
attack by combining it with construction of linear equation 
involving the lSBs of many intermediate encryption values, 
using square like structures. The attack improves the previously 
known results significantly. The attack requires only 16 known 
PTs for attacking five round IDEA with time complexity of 2114 
encryptions1.
3.1.5 Weak Keys in IDEA
Keys are said to be weak when some of its subkeys are 
zero or one or they comprises of large number of zero bits. 
Weak keys turn the modular multiplication in IDEA encryption 
into a linear operation. later it was explored that keys having 
runs of ones were also expressed as weak. 251 differential weak 
keys were discovered by Daemen14, et al. on IDEA cipher. He 
explained the test for membership of this weak class. This test 
requires only two encryptions and solution of sixteen non-linear 
Boolean equations, each equation having twelve variables. 
While Hawkes15 searched out 263 differential-linear weak keys 
for full cipher. later on exploration, new weak key class was 
given by Wagner of size 264. He used a cryptanalytic technique 
called Boomerang attack. Adding to this, class of 295 weak 
keys was discovered for 5-round IDEA on use of Boomerang 
membership test. These novel and advanced weak-key classes 
were built using Boomerang-style distinguisher. Weak-keys 
with zeros and ones can be fixed by using a constant which is 
XORed to all keys. While the problem of weak keys having 
runs of one’s still remain unaccounted.
3.1.6 Biclique Attack
Biclique18 attacks were introduced for hash function 
cryptanalysis as an extension to the initial structure technique, 
and later applied to block ciphers. In the biclique attack on 
block ciphers the full key space is partitioned into groups of 
keys, so that keys in a group can be efficiently tested in the 
meet-in-the-middle framework. The keyspace partition can 
be described in various ways. For permutation based key 
schedules as in IDEA we simply introduce three sets of key 
bits: Kb, Kf , and Kg. In a key group the value Kg is fixed (and 
hence enumerates the groups), and Kb and Kf take all possible 
values. Biclique attacks is a variant of MITM, it uses structure 
of biclique extend the number of rounds attacked by MITM. 
Biclique attack is 218 times faster than brute force, an earlier 
intuition that this class of attacks only used for small speed-
ups over brute force search is dismissed19. In this attack on 
block ciphers, groups of keys are generated by partitioning 
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full key space, so that keys in a group can be efficiently 
tested in the MITM attack framework. Here, biclique is a set 
of internal states, constructed either in the first or in the last 
rounds of a cipher and mapped to each other by specifically 
chosen keys. The biclique approach to IDEA improves the 
cryptanalysis results on more rounds, and improves time and 
data complexities over existing attacks.
3.1.7 The combination of standard MITM with the keyless 
Biryukov-Demirci (BD) relation is used to obtain an attack on 
6 round variant of IDEA. This starts after MA layer of second 
round. Here, data complexity is only 16 known plaintext 
and time complexity less than 2112 encryption13. In the attack 
computation of the same intermediate value V is performed 
in two separate ways, they divide the term equation in two 
sets, where the terms in the first set is calculated using only 
the plaintexts and set Kt of key bits, and terms of second set 
is calculated using ciphertexts and the set Kb of the key bits. 
For each guess of Kt, For the first set cryptanalyst calculates 
the exclusive OR of  all terms in the equation saves it into table 
with a data structure  based on hashing. After that using hit and 
trial approach for the sub-key Kb, cryptanalyst calculates the 
exclusive OR of all terms belonging to second set, and then 
look for a match in the table created. Various attack attempts 
on reduced round IDEA with chosen plaintext and required 
memory along with time complexity are as shown in Table 2.
3.1.8 Data-Efficient Attacks on    
Reduced-round IDEA
Initial attack on IDEA cipher has huge data requirement 
of 2127 which is as bad as average exhaustive search 
time for key. In 2009, lai and Sun proposed first data 
efficient attack for 6 round. They reduced data requirement 
from 264 to 249 with time complexity from 2127 to 2112.1. 
Biham20, et al. proposed innovative new data efficient 
attacks on reduced-round and the full IDEA cipher. They 
improved previous attack by lai and Sun drastically 
in term of data complexity to just 16 plaintext data 
with almost same time complexity for 6 round IDEA. 
Biham20, et al. could attack 6.5 rounds by increasing the 
data requirement from 16 to 1000 with time complexity 
of 2114, by combining the improved MITM and the 
Biryukov-Demirci (BM) relation. By keyless version 
of BM relation used, they extended the attack to more 
number of rounds and with less data requirement. They 
explained best result for 7.5 rounds, in which they used 
MITM with slice and cut approach, with just 263 data 
and 2114 time complexity they attacked 7.5 rounds. They 
extended the attack of full cipher using just 16 plaintext 
data with time complexity 2126.8, these results were very 
good in terms of data requirement. It is observed that 
there is a tradeoff between data complexity and time 
complexity, less the data complexity the more is time 
complexity.
3.1.9 Schneier21, et al. in their attack on IDEA exploited its 
key schedule since key schedule of IDEA is quite simple, sub 
keys are calculated by simply circularly shifting the original 
key 25 times in key scheduling algorithm.  For 3-round IDEA, 
authors proposed a chosen key differential attack; it recovers 
32 bits of key with 6 chosen plaintexts (PT). Out of these 6 
PT, two are used with first key and the remaining four with 
the second key. In order to recover another 64 bits of key it 
needs 217 chosen PT under third key.  Rest of the 32 bits is 
recovered using brute forcedly trying all 232, choices. Schneier, 
et al. also proposed other variant of attack which  is applicable 
on non reduced round IDEA with COA timing 
attack model.  This attack enquires about 5x 
217, related keys and it encrypts 10, 48,576 (220) 
random chosen unknown PT blocks with these 
related keys. But, the difficult part of this attack 
is to accurately measure the timings of these 
encryptions.
3.1.10 Cryptanalysis of IDEA using   
  SAT Solvers  
Nakahara22, et al. investigates the power of 
SAT solvers in cryptanalysis. Their contributions 
are two-fold and are relevant to both theory and 
practice. Firstly, Authors explains how to convert the 
problem of cryptanalysis into system of equations 
and represent them efficiently into satisfiability 
(SAT) problem. Now the problem is encoded into 
SAT instance which solved using SAT solvers for 
solutions. The technique is efficient and generic. 
It can be applied on variety of symmetric block 
ciphers. This method can be used to automate the 
first step of algebraic attacks, i.e. the generation 
of a system of algebraic equations. Secondly, they 
mentions the scenarios wherein the SAT solvers 
are not suitable to attack cryptographic algorithms 
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BD Biryukov-Demirci, Time complexity measured in encryptions.
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such as to find weak keys in symmetric key block ciphers and 
to compute the pre-images in hash functions. SAT solvers 
allow to find or prove the absence of, weak-key classes under 
both differential and linear attacks of full-round block ciphers 
based on IDEA. Generically, a weak key of a block cipher is a 
user key which leads to a non-random behavior of the cipher. 
Ideally, a block cipher should have no weak keys. For IDEA 
and related ciphers mentioned previously, a weak key causes 
some multiplicative subkeys to have value 0 or 1, turning 
multiplication into a linear operation. These multiplicative 
subkeys are mandatory inputs to a multiplication operation 
over GF (216 + 1), where 0= 216 by construction. Note that 216 + 
1 is a prime number. Authors have found classes of weak keys 
of block ciphers based on IDEA4.
SAT solvers and cryptanalysis.
The Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT) was mentioned 
as a useful framework for cryptanalysis. The relation between 
input and output bits of a cryptographic algorithm can be 
expressed as a SAT problem which can then be supplied to a 
SAT-solver in order to recover the secret keys (e.g. key bits). 
The problem SAT can be solved by different types of solvers. 
Authors consider only complete SAT solvers, i.e. deterministic 
algorithms in which input is a given formula in conjunctive 
normal form (CNF) and output is always a satisfying valuation 
of its variables, in case such a valuation exists. Otherwise, the 
SAT solver outputs that the SAT instance is unsatisfiable. A 
CNF is a conjunction of clauses, where a clause is a disjunction 
of literals, and a literal is a propositional variable or its 
negation. Sometimes converting the problem into CNF is also 
quite challenging.
Finally their results shows weak keys of the full 8.5-round 
WIDEA-4 and WIDEA-8 block ciphers under differential and 
linear attacks. Standard techniques22 to accelerate exhaustive 
search (brute force ) on IDEA block cipher:
3.1.11. Standard Techniques22 to Accelerate Exhaustive 
Search (Brute Force ) on IDEA Block Cipher
(a)  The Early Abort Technique: As soon as we observe a wrong 
ciphertext bit produced by a possible key, we can discard 
this possible key without computing the full ciphertext. 
Similarly we can discard whole class of possible keys 
which produces such a wrong ciphertext bit. E.g. in IDEA 
cipher last round called output transformation round; 
there are total four operations two multiplication and two 
additions each. On performing the first multiplication 
operation we get first 16 bits of ciphertext, if these bits 
are incorrect then no need to perform rest of the three 
operations out four operations. We can simply discard that 
particular possible key. Thus using early abort 75 per cent 
of efforts can be saved in output transformation round.
(b)  The Distributive Technique: The distributive techniques 
for speed up of exhaustive trail is very much similar to the 
mathematical distributive law ab+ac=a(b+c), by taking 
common a out of parenthesis, here we compute a followed 
by b and again compute a followed by c which can be 
done like computing a once followed by (b+c) e.g. in the 
first round of IDEA cipher only first 96 bits are used for 
six subkeys, remaining  32 bits are not used in first round. 
First round operations does not use those last 32 bits of 
master key, so these operations can be performed once for 
all remaining choice of keys. Similarly we can apply this 
technique for decryption process also when few key bits 
are not used in last round of decryption process and can 
save lot of effort by not doing same thing multiple times.
(c)  The distributive technique can be improved by clubbing it 
with MITM technique. When few key bits are not used in 
initial as well as last rounds operations, so adversary can 
perform these operations with all choices of key bits with 
MITM. e.g. IDEA cipher key bits 125-127 are not used in 
round 1,8,9 which allows us using distributive technique 
and MITM to reduce the exhaustive trial effort by 25 per 
cent, 3 out of 8.5 rounds.
4.  CONCLUSION
This paper explains important attack on block ciphers. 
It explains working of IDEA cipher and its key scheduling 
algorithm. Here we give brief overview of PGP and how IDEA 
is used in it for providing confidentiality. It gives a review of 
the work related to the IDEA Block cipher and various attacks 
attempted over it. Additionally it shows how SAT solvers are 
useful in IDEA cryptanalysis. Use of SAT solvers and parallel 
implementation of SAT solvers may help to improve execution 
rounds within minimal complexity. In literature till 2015, there 
are attacks up to reduced round of IDEA with varying time and 
data complexities. Thus, there has not been a single attack that 
could break the practical security of IDEA cipher, which shows 
that IDEA is robust system for providing confidentiality and is 
still in use after 25 years of its inception.
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